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INTRODUCTION
The year 1969 marked a sea change for the U.S. Supreme Court. President Nixon’s
appointment of conservative judge Warren E. Burger to replace Earl Warren as Chief Justice
signified the end of a liberal era for the Court.1 By 1972, Nixon had also appointed Justices
Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist,2 solidifying the Court’s rightward shift. Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr., a stalwart liberal, responded to this conservative transformation by dissenting in more
than three dozen decisions from 1971 to 1976.3 Convinced that the Court was no longer a reliable
vehicle for progressive change, Justice Brennan sought to identify and champion an alternative
means by which liberal-minded litigants could achieve their ends.4 Thus was the genesis of his
celebrated 1977 article, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,5 in which he
scolded the Supreme Court for “condon[ing] both isolated and systematic violations of civil
liberties”6 and beseeched state courts to “step into the breach” by broadly interpreting state
* J.D., Class of 2020, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School. I would like to thank Abel Rodriguez for his
encouragement and feedback. I would also like to thank the editors of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Law and
Social Change for their assistance.
1 Justices 1789 to Present, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, https://www.supremecourt.gov/
about/members_text.aspx [https://perma.cc/C7BY-LJ9M].
2 Id.
3 Goodwin Liu, State Courts and Constitutional Structure, 128 YALE L.J. 1304, 1312–13 (2019) (book
review).
4 See Randall T. Shepard, The Maturing Nature of State Constitution Jurisprudence, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 421,
422–23 (1996).
5 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489
(1977).
6 Id. at 503 (internal footnotes omitted).
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constitutional provisions to protect litigants whose federal remedies may be foreclosed.7 “State
constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties,” Brennan noted.8 “With federal scrutiny
diminished, state courts must respond by increasing their own.”9
Justice Brennan’s article “is one of the most influential law-journal articles ever
published.”10 It has been hailed as “the starting point of the modern re-emphasis on state
constitutions” and a “clarion call to state judges to wield their own bills of rights” for the protection
of individual and civil rights.11 Over the past four decades, many state courts have, in fits and starts,
come to play the role of rights innovators – recognizing important rights and protections well before
the U.S. Supreme Court does so, or extending rights beyond that Court’s baseline requirements.12
Justice Brennan’s call to arms was well-heeded. Since the 1980s, individual and organizational
litigators have appealed to state constitutional provisions to achieve significant progressive gains at
the state level,13 notably on issues such as marriage equality,14 school funding,15 capital
punishment,16 criminal procedure and search and seizure doctrine,17 legislative redistricting,18 and
7 Id. at 504.
8 Id. at 491.
9 Id. at 503.
10 John Dinan, State Constitutional Amendments and American Constitutionalism, 41 OKLA. CITYU. L. REV.
27, 27 (2016) (citing Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time, 110 MICH. L.
REV. 1483, 1489 (2012)) (ranking Justice Brennan’s article in ninth place with 1,701 citations).
11 Shepard, supra note 4, at 421–22 (quoting David Shuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1197,
1197 n.1 (1992) and Cathleen C. Herasimchuk, The New Federalism: Judicial Legislation by the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals?, 68 TEX, L. REV. 1481, 1492 (1990)).
12 Dinan, supra note 10, at 42.
13 See id. at 39–41.
14 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), was preceded by a slow and steady march of state court
decisions. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) (holding that “barring an
individual from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely because that person would marry a person
of the same sex violates the Massachusetts Constitution.”); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999) (holding that same-
sex couples are entitled under the Vermont Constitution “to obtain the same benefits and protections afforded by Vermont
law to married opposite-sex couples.”).
15 See RANDY J. HOLLAND ET AL., STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 585–634 (2d ed. 2016) (outlining fairly
successful state-level school funding equality and adequacy litigation in the wake of San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), which held that education is not a fundamental right entitled to strict scrutiny under the U.S.
Constitution and that wealth is not a suspect classification). See also JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS 30
(2018) (“All told, roughly forty-four States by now have faced state-constitutional challenges to their systems of funding
public schools. Plaintiffs have won twenty-seven of these challenges at some point and in the process compelled legislatures
to adopt a host of additional reforms, many of which increased funding and closed equity gaps.”) (internal footnotes omitted).
16 See, e.g., State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 621, 627 (Wash. 2018) (declaring that the death penalty violates the
Washington State Constitution); Brief for Petitioners at 15–16, Cox v. Commonwealth, 218 A.3d 384 (Pa. 2019) (Nos. 102
EM 2018 & 103 EM 2018) (submitting that the death penalty violates the Pennsylvania Constitution).
17 See generally HOLLAND ET AL., supra note 15, at 337–467 (discussing many categories of state-level
protections for criminal suspects or defendants that exceed the federal “floor” of rights and requirements set by the U.S.
Constitution).
18 See, e.g., League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 737 (Pa. 2018) (striking down the
2011 Pennsylvania congressional district plan for partisan gerrymandering in violation of the constitution of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and ordering state lawmakers to draw remedial maps in advance of the 2018 election
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol23/iss3/3
2020] STATECONSTITUTIONS AND PROGRESSIVECRIMMIGRATION REFORM 253
property rights.19 Federalism appeals now have purchase well beyond states-rights conservatives.
As this jurisprudence of state constitutional doctrine developed, a separate area of law was
beginning to take shape: “crimmigration law,” or the criminalization of immigration law.20 Juliet
Stumpf, who coined the term, identifies the merger of criminal and immigration law as playing out
in three main ways: “(1) the substance of immigration law increasingly overlaps, (2) immigration
enforcement has come to resemble criminal law enforcement, and (3) the procedural aspects of
prosecuting immigration violations have taken on many of the earmarks of criminal procedure.”21
More concretely, owing to a series of legislative and policy amendments during the 1980s and
1990s, several trends emerged: the number of migrants deported for having a criminal record
multiplied because negative immigration consequences attach to an increasing number of crimes;
the number of migrants in immigration detention multiplied because Congress expanded
immigration officials’ ability and funding to detain non-citizens; and the number of migrants
prosecuted for immigration-related crimes multiplied due to increasing reliance on criminal justice
systems as a means of immigration control.22 These trends continue unabated.23 As a striking
example of the recent criminalization of immigration, “criminal activity appears to have affected
the ability of more than three times as many people to live in the United States in 2013 than
throughout most of the twentieth century combined.”24
Despite the success of state-level efforts to address other issues of social importance in
recent decades,25 crimmigration law has not yet been examined through the lens of state
constitutionalism. The paucity of scholarship on the intersection of these subjects is surprising,
given that a popular view on the left of the political spectrum is that immigrant rights are civil
rights,26 and Justice Brennan envisioned civil rights as potentially needing extra protection during
times, as now, when conservatism prevails at the federal level. To what extent can state
constitutionalism serve as a vehicle for advancing a more progressive crimmigration agenda? Here,
“state constitutionalism” signifies the use of direct democracy measures to amend state constitutions
or create new state laws, as well as advocacy for expanded rights in state courts via appeals to state
cycle).
19 See Jeffrey S. Sutton, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez And Its Aftermath, 94 VA.
L. REV. 1963, 1984–85 (2008) (describing the variety of state legislation, state constitutional amendments, and state-court
decisions limiting the eminent domain power in response to Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), which held
that a city does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s taking clause if it obtains property through eminent domain and sells it
to private developers in furtherance of an economic development plan).
20 See Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV.
367, 376–380 (2006).
21 Id. at 381. For a more recent and detailed overview of the basic contours of crimmigration law, see CÉSAR
CUAUHTÉMOCGARCÍAHERNÁNDEZ, CRIMMIGRATION LAW 1–21 (2015).
22 GARCÍAHERNÁNDEZ, supra note 21, at 9.
23 See id. at 9–15.
24 Id. at 8 (referencing the fact that 70,956 people were removed for criminal convictions in the eight or nine
decades preceding the mid-1980s, whereas the number of people removed for criminal convictions in 2013 was 216,810).
25 See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
26 See, e.g., Cecilia Chen & Robin Goldfaden, Closing the Gap in Understanding Immigrant Rights as Civil
Rights, 47 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 169 (2013); Claire G. Gastanaga, Immigrant Rights are Civil
Rights, ACLU OF VIRGINIA (Apr. 24, 2013, 8:53 AM), https://acluva.org/en/news/immigrant-rights-are-civil-rights
[https://perma.cc/SB24-S6F3].
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constitutional provisions.
This article proceeds in four main parts. Part I provides a basic overview of the history and
evolution of “immigration federalism” and elaborates on how crimmigration law fits within that
framework. It also identifies several obstacles to pursuing progressive crimmigration policy at the
national level. Part II briefly discusses the development of “New Judicial Federalism” – the term
frequently used to describe the revitalization of state constitutional law associated with Justice
Brennan’s 1977 article – and then examines potential benefits of fighting for progressive change
under that rubric. Part III identifies three policies that could advance rights-expansive crimmigration
reform at the state level and suggests the mechanisms by which they might be achieved. Finally,
Part IV identifies a number of challenges that may hinder pro-migrant advocates. Although activists
on the left should continue to consider state constitutionalism as one avenue for change, its promise
for crimmigration reform is likely limited.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM AND CRIMMIGRATION
Responsibility for the regulation of immigration and immigrants has shifted between states
and localities, on the one hand, and the federal government, on the other, throughout the history of
the United States. From the colonial era until the end of the Civil War, colonies or states and
localities primarily regulated immigration, although the federal government oversaw
naturalization.27 That arrangement shifted abruptly in 1875, when the Supreme Court decided, in
the first of a series of cases,28 that the conditions under which noncitizens could enter and remain
in the United States was subject to the near-exclusive control of the federal government, due to its
prerogative to regulate foreign policy.29 For over 100 years, until the mid-1990s,30 Congress
essentially prohibited or severely limited subfederal entities from regulating the movement or
presence of noncitizens within their borders.31 The federal government beat back any attempt by
states to venture into this arena by appealing to the plenary power and equal protection doctrines,
as well as constitutional or structural preemption.32
Given the U.S. government’s century of uninterrupted dominance over most aspects of
immigration law and alienage law, the recent reemergence of states and localities as significant
players is an especially notable development.33 This “new immigration federalism,” or simply
27 Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Immigration Federalism: A Reappraisal, 88
N.Y.U. L. REV. 2074, 2076, 2084 (2013).
28 Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875).
29 See Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power over Immigration, 86 N.C.
L. REV. 1557, 1558–59 (2008).
30 See Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimensions of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787,
799 (2008); Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1361, 1365 (1999).
31 See Stumpf, supra note 29, at 1570–71; Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, supra note 27, at 2089.
32 See Stumpf, supra note 29, at 1581–82. Though still a relevant aspect of immigration federalism, this article
will not address preemption considerations. For greater treatment of that topic, see GARCÍAHERNÁNDEZ, supra note 21, at
184–190.
33 See Huntington, supra note 30, at 795–96; Motomura, supra note 30, at 1361, 1365. The distinction
between immigration law and alienage law is that the former deals with the terms of admission and removal of noncitizens,
while the latter governs the rights and obligations of noncitizens once they are inside of the country. Huntington, supra note
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“immigration federalism,” is generally defined as a relationship in which states and localities
operate under and respect federal immigration prerogatives, but concurrently play a substantial role
in regulating noncitizens within their territories.34
Though the significance and prevalence of new immigration federalism is undisputed –
indeed, there has been a “veritable deluge” of subfederal legislation designed to regulate noncitizens
in the past decade35 – explanations for its rise to prominence are more contested. The justifications
for increased state and local involvement in immigration-adjacent matters are important, in part,
because they gesture to how subfederal entities rationalize crimmigration-related policies, for better
or worse. Common rationales include, first and foremost, a widespread perception that the current
federal immigration system is dysfunctional and unable to address unauthorized migration.
Additional explanations include changing regional demographics, tightening state and local
budgets, the increased political salience of unauthorized migration, and heightened national security
concerns.36 Regardless of the reasons, however, the import of new immigration federalism is that
states and localities now unquestionably interact with a wide range of issues affecting migrants
within their borders. For instance, subfederal entities implement federally-mandated programs,
provide services required by the courts, oversee community integration of refugees and other
migrants, and debate how to address immigration issues that arise in myriad policy arenas, such as
public health and health care, employment, higher education, law enforcement, and social
services.37
Having established that “pure” immigration law mostly remains the province of the federal
government but that states and localities now have substantial latitude to regulate migrants’ lives
without treading on federal toes,38 attempting to locate crimmigration law within this framework
30, at 795–96.
34 See, e.g., Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, supra note 27, at 2076 (defining “the new immigration
federalism” as the “recent resurgence of subfederal legislative activity” designed to “discover and discourage the presence
of undocumented persons.”); Huntington, supra note 30, at 788, 795–96 (defining “immigration federalism” as “increased
state and local involvement in immigration,” but not “pure” immigration law); Motomura, supra note 30, at 1361 (defining
“immigration federalism” as the “role . . . states and localities play in making and implementing law and policy relating to
immigration and migrants.”); Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 66–67
(2007) (defining “immigration federalism” as “arrangements . . . in which the states operate under, and are obliged to respect,
federal immigration policies and supervision.”).
35 See Stumpf, supra note 29, at 1559. See also ANN MORSE & GILBERTO SORIA MENDOZA, NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, IMMIGRATION REFORM AND STATE TRENDS, 22 LEGISBRIEF (Jan. 2014),
http://www.ncsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=C-T1UinGn8Q%3d&tabid=27702&portalid=1 [https://perma.cc/6AJX-
JFAC] (“The number of state immigration laws has steadily increased; since 2007, on average, 1,300 bills are introduced
and 200 laws are passed each year.”); ANNMORSE, IMMIGRANT POLICY PROJECT: REPORT ON STATE IMMIGRATION LAWS,
2018, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/immig/
ImmigPolicy_2018_v04.pdf [https://perma.cc/TST3-GT5V] (reporting that, in 2018, “[l]awmakers in 44 states, the District
of Columbia, and Puerto Rico enacted 175 laws” related to immigration”).
36 See Huntington, supra note 30, at 805–806; Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights: State and
Local Efforts to Regulate Immigration, 46 GA. L. REV. 609, 617 (2012). But see Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, supra note
27, at 2080–81 (discounting the demographic change rationale, based on a nationwide investigation of restrictionist
subfederal immigration laws, and instead attributing such policies to partisanship and political entrepreneurship).
37 See generallyMORSE&SORIAMENDOZA, supra note 35.
38 See GARCÍAHERNÁNDEZ, supra note 21, at 1821.
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complicates the picture by breaking down the apparent federal-subfederal dichotomy.39 In fact, as
Juliet Stumpf illustrates, the relationship is less dichotomy and more symbiosis:
As the criminalization of immigration law has expanded, state criminal law has
become a central focus of federal immigration law. The criminal grounds for
deportation do not distinguish between federal and state crimes. Because the
states are the primary players in criminal law, therefore, state statutory definitions
of crime play a major part in determining whether a federal deportability ground
will apply to a conviction. . . . State legislatures and courts can often affect
whether these deportability grounds apply by adjusting the scope of the definition
or length of the sentence. At bottom, the very fabric of crimmigration law
combines federal and state law: the warp is federally-defined immigration law,
and the woof is state-defined criminal law.40
Although states are not directly responsible for determining deportability grounds or
removing individuals from the country, the content of their criminal codes and law enforcement
policies can play an enormous role in limiting or expanding migrants’ exposure to federal
immigration enforcement authorities. Many states have played a direct role in increasing criminal
deportations by legislating new crimes designed to target migrants, expanding courts’ ability to
order migrants detained as they await criminal proceedings, and structuring law enforcement and
judicial processes to exacerbate the penalties migrants face for violations of immigration law.41
To display the extent to which federal-subfederal cooperation is often present within the
framework of immigration federalism, and to highlight how activities at the subfederal level can
place migrants in perilous immigration positions, two particular programs merit special attention.
The implementation of the Secure Communities program beginning in 2008 created, in the words
of a former U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Secretary, “a virtual ICE presence
at every local jail.”42 Essentially, any time a law enforcement officer processes fingerprints, they
could be matched to both criminal and immigration records.43 This infrastructure of shared records
between all levels of law enforcement and immigration authorities means that minor police
encounters, such as traffic stops, can lead to criminal and immigration background checks.44
Although the Secure Communities Program was temporarily suspended and replaced by a different
39 Indeed, Huntington asserts that “[t]he categories of immigration law and alienage law are not
watertight. . . . and the two often overlap as a practical matter.” Supra note 30, at 798.
40 Stumpf, supra note 29, at 1593–94.
41 GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 21, at 180. See also Huntington, supra note 30, at 802–03 (describing
subfederal lawmaking intended to target migrants and discourage their presence, such as laws and ordinances imposing civil
sanctions for employing or renting out property to undocumented migrants and criminal sanctions for actions such as
transporting undocumented migrants).
42 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, Wake County Sheriff’s Office First of 4 Sites in North Carolina to
Receive Full Interoperability Technology to Help Identify Criminal Aliens (Nov. 12, 2008), https://www.ice.gov/
news/releases/wake-county-sheriffs-office-first-4-sites-north-carolina-receive-full-interoperability
[https://perma.cc/WXK8-9559].
43 See GARCÍAHERNÁNDEZ, supra note 21, at 258–59.
44 Id. at 259.
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set of enforcement priorities in 2014 after facing much opposition,45 President Trump reactivated
the program in January 2017 via executive order.46
The 287(g) Program goes a step beyond Secure Communities by explicitly empowering
state and local law enforcement officers to enforce federal immigration law.47 Once trained, law
enforcement officers can effectively act as proxies for ICE agents, so long as their law enforcement
agency has signed a Memorandum of Agreement with ICE.48 As of July 2019, ICE had entered into
agreements with seventy-nine law enforcement agencies in twenty-one states.49 Once potentially
removable individuals have been identified through the Secure Communities and/or 287(g)
Programs, ICE can request advance notification of an individual’s release from the local jail in order
to ensure that such person is taken into ICE custody.50
From the foregoing discussion, it may seem that neither federal nor state avenues hold
promise for progressive crimmigration reform. By virtue of the existence of fifty states, however,
as opposed to one national government, there is a greater chance for success in at least some of
these many jurisdictions. Before turning to the reasons why states may, in fact, invite the attention
of activists, it is worth pausing to consider the obstacles that exist to pursuing change at the federal
level. Within the executive branch, which of course encompasses the President as well as
immigration enforcement agencies housed in the Department of Homeland Security and the
Department of Justice, it is safe to say that there has never been a worse time to pursue a progressive
crimmigration-related agenda.51 The legislative branch, meanwhile, has long suffered from the
perception – and, indeed, the reality, particularly when it comes to immigration reform – that it is
hamstrung when it comes to tackling significant issues of public importance.52 Finally, the Trump
administration has left a conservative imprint on the federal judiciary, not to mention the U.S.
Supreme Court.53 By filling vacancies – particularly at the circuit court level – at a faster rate than
45 See id. at 259–60.
46 Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/secure-
communities#wcm-survey-target-id [https://perma.cc/2XNF-X8DC] (last updated Mar. 20, 2018).
47 GARCÍAHERNÁNDEZ, supra note 21, at 261.
48 See Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMSENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/287g [https://perma.cc/G9AJ-SYLY] (last updated Oct. 4, 2019).
49 Id.
50 See GARCÍAHERNÁNDEZ, supra note 21, at 262–265.
51 See generally SARAH PIERCE ET AL., TRANSATLANTIC COUNCIL ON MIGRATION, U.S. IMMIGRATION
POLICY UNDER TRUMP (July 2018), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/
TCMTrumpSpring2018-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SSF-TU9D] (describing President Trump’s negative framing of
immigration and describing his administration’s actions, including enhanced immigration enforcement, reduction of
humanitarian programs, increased vetting and obstacles for legal immigration, and the end of the DACA program).
52 See, e.g., Priscilla Alvarez, Don’t Bet on Comprehensive Immigration Reform in the New Congress, THE
ATLANTIC (Nov. 24, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/11/democrats-are-divided-immigration-
reform/576457/ [https://perma.cc/ZK4Y-X45V]; Philip Elliott & Nash Jenkins, Republicans in Congress Search for an
Immigration Bill to End Border Crisis, TIME (June 20, 2018), http://time.com/5316742/donald-trump-immigration-bill-
family-separation/ [https://perma.cc/PJ4R-ZGQG]; Tara Golshan, Congress Failed to do Something on Immigration –
Again. Here’s Why., VOX (July 2, 2018, 9:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/7/2/17509726/congress-
fail-immigration-again [https://perma.cc/H7KL-R32V]. But seeNicholas Fandos, Senate Passes Bipartisan Criminal Justice
Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2GqmNnb [https://perma.cc/T5FS-X3U9].
53 See Kevin Schaul & Kevin Uhrmacher, How Trump is Shifting the Most Important Courts in the Country,
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any of his recent predecessors, with judges whose median age is 49 years old, the Trump
administration has left its mark on the federal judiciary for a generation to come.54
Facing indifference or hostility at the federal level, advocates seeking change to benefit
noncitizens with and without criminal records should focus their energies elsewhere. Writing after
President Trump’s appointment of Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court,
Goodwin Liu, an Associate Justice of the California Supreme Court, underscored the point: “Justice
Brennan’s 1977 paean to judicial federalism had particular resonance in light of the changing
composition and increasingly conservative tilt of the U.S. Supreme Court. We may be at a similar
moment today.”55 As if in response, after Justice Kavanaugh’s confirmation affirmed that the
Court’s majority would lean conservative, liberal lawyers reassessed their arsenal of strategies.56
Among other tactics, some organizational litigators have decided to focus more on state legislatures
and courts, as well as on means of advocacy at the state and local government levels apart from the
judiciary.57 More than forty years after Justice Brennan set the wheels of the New Judicial
Federalism in motion, there is once again renewed interest in and anticipation of independent state
constitutional interpretation.58
II. NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS
AS A POTENTIAL AVENUE FOR CHANGE
At the heart of New Judicial Federalism is the idea that state courts, through independent
interpretation of state constitutional clauses, can salvage and protect individual rights neglected or
encroached upon in federal jurisprudence.59But what exactly is meant by independent interpretation
of state constitutional clauses? The answer lies in the fact that many rights recognized in the colonies
and states during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries served as a template for the rights
recognized in the Bill of Rights to the U.S. Constitution.60 State court judges may, for example,
appeal to their state constitution’s unique history and distinct clauses to vindicate rights on unique
grounds, whether or not those rights are federally recognized.61 State-level judges may also exceed
the minimalist “floor” of rights in federal constitutional jurisprudence to impose additional or
independent rights and obligations grounded in the state constitution.62 Yet for a variety of
WASHINGTON POST (Sep. 4, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/politics/trump-federal-judges/
[https://perma.cc/8DQR-U7UD].
54 Id.
55 Goodwin Liu, supra note 3.
56 See Amanda Terkel, With Brett Kavanaugh on the Supreme Court, Liberal Lawyers Shift Strategies,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 29, 2018, 5:45 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/supreme-court-liberal-lawyers-brett-
kavanaugh_n_5bd22542e4b055bc948a0161?guccounter=1 [https://perma.cc/4TXA-NWL8].
57 Id.
58 See Seth F. Kreimer, Still Living After Fifty Years: A Census of Judicial Review under The Pennsylvania
Constitution of 1968, 71 RUTGERS L. REV. 287, 290–91 (2018).
59 Id.
60 See Joseph Blocher,What State Constitutional Law Can Tell Us About the Federal Constitution, 115 PENN.
STATE L. REV. 1035, 1036 (2010).
61 See infra text accompanying notes 82–88.
62 See Blocher, supra note 60, at 1037; ThomasM. Hardiman, New Judicial Federalism and the Pennsylvania
Experience: Reflections on the Edmunds Decision, 47 DUQ. L. REV. 503, 505–06 (2009); Kreimer, supra note 58, at 305.
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reasons,63 for most of this country’s history, federal constitutional law predominated, while
independent interpretation of states’ constitutional guarantees languished.64 It was not until Justice
Brennan’s entreaties that state courts began to respond to the Burger Court’s rights retrenchments
by safeguarding individual rights through state constitutionalism.65 “In time,” explains Judge
Thomas Hardiman, “state courts began experimenting with new federalism with increasing
confidence; between 1870 and 1989, approximately 600 published opinions interpreted state
constitutions more expansively than the United States Constitution.”66
Any hesitance willing states may once have had to “step into the breach” identified by
Justice Brennan has long since dissipated.67 Still, advocates hoping to pursue progressive
crimmigration policies – or for the purposes of this section, any liberal policy goals – via state
constitutionalism, ought to consider the advantages and disadvantages of such a strategy, separate
and apart from a decision to concurrently pursue or forgo federal remedies. So, why state
constitutions? As a preliminary matter, it is useful to distinguish the state constitutions,
categorically, from the federal constitution and from state statutes. The U.S. Constitution is a
document that is intentionally “negative,” in that it mainly imposes limits on governmental action.68
State constitutions, on the other hand, impose both “negative” limitations and “positive” obligations
on the state government,69 a feature which could potentially lend more footholds for protecting or
expanding individual rights.70 In regard to the distinction between state constitutions and state
statutes, constitutions represent the pinnacle of a state’s legal authority.71 Addressing a subject in
the constitution, instead of a statute, may more effectively protect that interest against encroachment
by other branches of government and will nullify any inconsistent legislation.72
Beyond these advantages of form and positioning, scholars of state constitutionalism have
identified several other reasons to recommend utilizing state constitutions as a conduit for reform-
minded, rights-expansive litigators. Firstly, lawyers who default to raising solely federal claims
practice at their peril: to overlook state or local laws is to potentially miss out on a second bite at
the apple when it comes to protecting their clients’ rights and interests.73 Second, it is far easier to
amend state constitutions than the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Constitution has only been amended
63 See Blocher, supra note 60, at 1036–37 (identifying, as reasons for the relegation of state constitutional
rights, the decline of state identity and the rise of incorporation doctrine).
64 Id.
65 See Hardiman, supra note 62, at 505–06.
66 Id. at 505.
67 See id. at 506 (“Today, the power of the states to interpret their constitutions to offer broader protection of
individual rights than that required by the United States Constitution is undisputed.”).
68 See SUTTON, supra note 15, at 34–35.
69 Id.
70 See, e.g., Dinan, supra note 10, at 36 (comparing federal constitutional amendments unfavorably to state
constitutional amendments, which are “a regular vehicle for expanding or clarifying rights”).
71 Jack Stark, A Practical Guide to Drafting State Constitutional Provisions, 73 TEMPLE L. REV. 1061, 1064
(2000) (internal citations omitted).
72 Id.
73 See Jeffrey S. Sutton, Why Teach – And Why Study – State Constitutional Law, 34 OKLA. CITYU. L. REV.
165, 172 (2009). See also Brennan, supra note 5, at 502 (1977) (“I suggest to the bar that, although in the past it might have
been safe for counsel to raise only federal constitutional issues in state courts, plainly it would be most unwise these days
not also to raise the state constitutional questions.”).
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twenty-seven times – the first ten in 1791 – while “the fifty current state constitutions have been
amended 7,481 times for an average of nearly 150 amendments per state.”74 Thirdly, on matters
arising solely under state law and constitution, the decisions of state supreme courts are final and
binding, unable to be reviewed or overturned by any federal court.75
Fourth, it is often easier to win in state courts than federal courts, in part because the
hurdles of standing and justiciability are comparatively lower at the state level,76 and in part because
a state court may be more willing to engage with thorny legal and equitable complexities than a
federal court, which may need to fashion a more one-size-fits-all solution.77 Compared to the U.S.
Supreme Court in particular, which must announce rights and remedies for the entire nation, it is
easier for state supreme courts to venture into the proverbial thicket and define constitutional rights
or craft remedies for the citizens of their state alone.78As a corollary, state judges may feel relatively
less constrained than federal ones because the narrower scope makes it easier to correct a poorly
reasoned or mistaken constitutional decision.79
Fifth, state courts can consider local conditions, culture, geography, or other considerations
that federal courts, practically, cannot.80 Such considerations play into interpreting state
constitutional rights as well as designing remedies that are responsive to circumstances on the
ground or that can be tailored to address the litigants’ specific needs.81 Sixth, and on a related note,
state judges can consider the unique textual guarantees and rich histories of their state constitutional
provisions.82 When comparing state versus federal constitutions, all state constitutions have (1)
“parallel” provisions – ones with matching federal counterparts, (2) “congruent” provisions – ones
that “govern issues and embody norms that are also addressed by the federal constitution but utilize
distinctive wording and often have distinctive history”, and (3) “skew” provisions, which have no
federal counterpart.83 The latter category provides lawyers and state court judges the chance to
vindicate rights that do not exist at the federal level.84 Examples of skew provisions include single-
subject clauses, uniform-law clauses, right-to-remedies clauses, right to privacy, and provisions
granting workers’ rights and environmental rights.85 Despite the obvious advocacy opportunity
presented by skew provisions, however, parallel and congruent provisions also hold out the promise
of independent interpretation, because state judges can examine those provisions’ state-specific
74 Dinan, supra note 10, at 30.
75 See Brennan, supra note 5, at 501.
76 Id.
77 Sutton, supra note 73, at 174. See also Liu, supra note 3, at 1322 (observing, in reference to school funding
litigation and Fourth Amendment doctrine, that “[p]roblems with a high level of practical complexity may not be amenable
to national solutions or, if resolved by a national court, may result in a federalism discount that dilutes the underlying right.”).
78 See Sutton, supra note 73, at 173.
79 Id. at 174.
80 Id. at 173–74.
81 See id.
82 See Goodwin Liu, State Constitutions and the Protections of Individual Rights: A Reappraisal, 92 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1307, 1338 (2017).
83 See Kreimer, supra note 58, at 317–18.
84 See Sutton, supra note 73, at 176.
85 Id.; Liu, supra note 3, at 1327–28.
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history and doctrine to shape its contours differently from federal counterparts.86 For example,
attorneys who practice criminal law in Pennsylvania appeal to that Commonwealth’s robust
tradition of interpreting protections regarding search and seizure and criminal trials more broadly
than analogous federal provisions,87 and several state supreme courts have found the death penalty
unconstitutional based on differently-worded ‘cruel and unusual’ or due process provisions.88
Finally, utilizing state constitutionalism to advance progressive reforms can facilitate the
development of federal law, with states taking the lead as rights innovators.89 As prominent
constitutional scholar Erwin Chemerinsky observes, “There are many examples where state courts
interpreting state constitutions preceded and arguably led to the greater recognition of rights under
the United States Constitution,” citing, for example, the California Supreme Court’s decision
overturning an anti-miscegenation law based on its state constitution’s equal protection clause, more
than twenty years before Loving v. Virginia.90 Litigating issues in state courts allows wary federal
and Supreme Court justices to observe the development of doctrines and tests coming out of state
constitutional courts, and once an accumulation of state decisions convinces the Supreme Court
justices to take up an issue, they can pick and choose from among emerging options.91 Some
scholars even view this strategy as preferable to first petitioning at the federal level, because
devolution to states might “ensure, for better or worse, that the national government does not enact
legislation reflecting extremes at either end of the political spectrum.”92 This perspective is
sometimes called the “steam valve” theory because, the reasoning goes, more extreme sentiments
that find purchase at the state level will diminish interest by parties to seek national legislation or
court decisions.93
Despite the apparent benefits of using the state courts as a primary forum for change, some
scholars still see the strategy as inherently limiting for advancing individual liberties and civil rights.
The chance of succeeding in all or even most states is slim, making state constitutional law, in the
eyes of Chemerinsky, a distant second-best strategy when compared to advocacy under the U.S.
Constitution.94 Yet Chemerinsky acknowledges that some state-level success is better than nothing
if otherwise faced with failure at the Supreme Court,95 and that is the very situation in which
progressive crimmigration-reform advocates find themselves. Given this reality, Part IV considers
86 See Brennan, supra note 5, at 500 (“Other examples abound where state courts have independently
considered the merits of constitutional arguments and declined to follow opinions of the United States Supreme Court they
find unconvincing, even where the state and federal constitutions are similarly or identically phrased.”); Liu, supra note 82,
at 1314–15, 1338; Liu, supra note 3, at 1328.
87 See Kreimer, supra note 58, at 322.
88 See State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 621, 627 (Wash. 2018); Liu, supra note 3, at 1329 (noting Connecticut’s
jurisprudence in this area).
89 See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). See also Sutton, supra note
73, at 176.
90 Erwin Chemerinsky, Essay: Two Cheers for State Constitutional Law, 62 STANFORD L. REV. 1695, 1703
(2010).
91 See Liu, supra note 3, at 1323; See Sutton, supra note 73, at 177.
92 Huntington, supra note 30, at 831–32.
93 See Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1627 (1997).
See also Liu, supra note 3, at 1314.
94 See Chemerinsky, supra note 90, at 1696–1700.
95 Id. at 1700.
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three policies that lawyers and activists could push for at the state level, and reviews mechanisms
for doing so.
III. ADVANCING PROGRESSIVE CRIMMIGRATION POLICY
As discussed above,96 states and localities do not directly control a noncitizen’s entry, exit,
or conditions of stay, but they do have discretion to determine the content of their criminal codes
and set law enforcement policy. This area of subfederal control provides a natural opening for
advocates of progressive crimmigration reform. Three issues that have gained growing traction in
the states, and which would greatly benefit noncitizens by preventing contact with the criminal
justice system, are marijuana legalization, “sanctuary” policies, and driver’s license policies. This
Part will address each in turn, before providing an overview of the mechanisms of change afforded
by state constitutions.
The Controlled Substances Act still classifies marijuana as a Schedule I drug, making it a
federal offense to possess, buy, or sell marijuana.97 In states, however, the picture is radically
different. No longer just a leftist and libertarian crusade, an increasing number of states are
embracing marijuana-related reforms in the criminal justice system. Since the mid-1990s, a total of
thirty-three states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have
approved comprehensive medical marijuana programs,98 while a total of eleven states and the
District of Columbia have legalized small amounts of marijuana for adult recreational use.99 An
additional twenty-six states and the District of Columbia have decriminalized small amounts of
marijuana.100 Decriminalization can take several forms, but “this generally means certain small,
personal-consumption amounts are [made] a civil or local infraction, not a state crime []or are
[made] a lowest misdemeanor with no possibility of jail time[].”101
Reforming how marijuana is legally classified and policed has been an important objective
within the social justice community that has steadily gained support over the years, especially as
public awareness has grown around the disproportionate policing of Black and brown bodies.102
Given that many noncitizens are people of color, they have not been exempt from the racial and
social impacts of marijuana criminalization and enforcement.103 Importantly, activists should be
aware that, although decriminalization is undoubtedly better than nothing, there are several
96 See Part II.
97 State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 16, 2019),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/7PU3-KDBA].
98 Id.
99 Marijuana Overview, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 17, 2019),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/marijuana-overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/CFA4-8TZ8].
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 See Jordan Cunnings, Nonserious Marijuana Offenses and Noncitizens: Uncounseled Pleas and
Disproportionate Consequences, 62 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 510, 516 (2015); Trip Gabriel, Legalizing Marijuana With a Focus
on Social Justice, United 2020 Democrats, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/17/us/politics/
marijuana-legalize-democrats.html [https://perma.cc/6ZJV-HUKK].
103 See Cunnings, supra note 102, at 516.
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worrying consequences from a crimmigration perspective.104 For lawful permanent residents
(LPRs), a marijuana offense with a very minimal criminal sanction can have disastrous immigration
consequences.105 In short, because individuals in most jurisdictions are not entitled to a public
defender unless jail time is at stake, LPRs who live in jurisdictions where low-level marijuana
offenses are punished with fines, probation, or drug treatment can unwittingly resolve their cases –
without the assistance of public defenders to warn of potential immigration consequences – in a
way that counts as a conviction under federal immigration law, possibly leading to deportation.106
Therefore, marijuana legalization is the far better policy aim to protect certain noncitizens from
deportability, although subfederal legalization, of course, cannot protect individuals charged by the
federal government.107
Another progressive reform that helps reduce migrants’ contact with the criminal justice
system, thereby reducing the likelihood that they may face deportation based on criminal grounds,
is implementing limited cooperation policies, or “sanctuary” policies, as they are more popularly
known. Though there is no standard definition for limited cooperation policies, they are migrant-
inclusionary policies with the aim of shielding noncitizens from immigration law enforcement.108
For instance, subfederal law enforcement agencies can decline to enter into 287(g) agreements with
ICE or limit the length of immigration detainers.109 Law enforcement officers can also choose to
limit investigative cooperation and exercise discretion in policing, such as intentionally not asking
about citizenship status or not sharing that information with ICE.110 Due to the diverse array of
policy options available and the ever-shifting landscape of immigration enforcement, it is hard to
pin down accurate numbers. As of April 2019, ten states and the District of Columbia have
implemented some limited cooperation measures, while ten states actively require subfederal
entities to help enforce federal immigration laws.111 Depending on the political inclinations of the
state or municipality, the numerous forms of limited cooperation policies provide many
opportunities for pro-migrant activism.
Finally, states can join the growing push to issue drivers’ licenses to residents regardless
of immigration status. As of December 2019, fifteen states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto
Rico issue licenses to applicants who provide certain identity-confirming documents, but they do
not require proof of legal residence.112 Providing drivers’ licenses to qualified residents, regardless
of citizenship status, can greatly reduce the fear and consequences surrounding a traffic stop,
104 See id. at 515–17.
105 Id. at 515–16.
106 See id. at 516–17, 529. Cunnings acknowledges the “personal use” exception under the Immigration and
Nationality Act’s criminal deportability grounds, but notes that those who have committed more than one marijuana-related
offense are ineligible for such exception, and that “it is often not difficult for the government to prove that a conviction does
not fit into the personal use exception” Id. at 533.
107 See id. at 524–25.
108 See GARCÍAHERNÁNDEZ, supra note 21, at 270.
109 See Ann Morse et al., Sanctuary Policy FAQ, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (June 20,
2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/sanctuary-policy-faq635991795.aspx [https://perma.cc/47LR-T7AX].
110 See id.
111 Id.
112 See STATE LAWS PROVIDING ACCESS TODRIVER’S LICENSES OR CARDS, REGARDLESS OF IMMIGRATION
STATUS, NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR. (Dec. 2019), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/drivers-license-
access-table.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZA89-HR6K].
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dreaded by so many undocumented people who must drive to work, particularly in areas with
limited public transportation options.113Minor traffic infractions or fender benders, which pose little
more than an inconvenience or financial hardship for U.S. citizens, can have devastating
consequences for those driving without licenses due to their inability to prove legal residence.114 As
stated by one New York state police chief, “If there was a valid licensed driver driving the
vehicle . . . there would [be] no need to call Border Patrol to confirm the ID of the driver.”115
Though an ICE spokesperson claimed in 2017 that the agency does not keep statistics on
traffic stops that have led to detention,116 a 2010 New York Times article stated that, according to
Department of Homeland Security figures, “at least 30,000 undocumented immigrants who were
stopped for common traffic violations in the last three years . . . ended up in deportation
proceedings,” and that “the numbers [we]re rapidly increasing.”117 That same 2010 article estimated
that 4.5 million undocumented individuals were driving regularly in the United States.118 Most
would not have possessed drivers’ licenses, since at that time “[o]nly three states . . . issue[d]
licenses [to applicants] without proof of legal residence.”119 Proponents of driver’s license
campaigns often tout the public safety and fiscal benefits of issuing licenses to undocumented
residents,120 but the number of undocumented drivers that stand to benefit from license-expansion
laws should, by itself, be enough to appeal to activists concerned about crimmigration
consequences.
Once advocates have identified realistic opportunities for state- or local-level reform, the
question becomes how to enshrine those policies in law. This article aims to examine the extent to
which “state constitutionalism,” broadly construed, can assist the fight for progressive
crimmigration reform. Vis-à-vis state judiciaries, individual or organizational litigators with an
appropriate case can argue for particular interpretations of rights and obligations in state
constitutional clauses, though more research needs to be done into clauses that could support the
types of reforms sought by crimmigration advocates. Campaigns to implement “sanctuary” policies
can sometimes be achieved by appealing to executive figures, such as governors or mayors, in a
way that bypasses any consideration of state constitutionalism. State legislatures, of course, can
pass all three types of reforms described above, though state constitutionalism is not directly
implicated except that legislation facing legal challenge could, perhaps, be upheld by reliance on
state constitutional provisions. When it comes to state legislatures and opportunities for direct
113 See Liz Robbins, Driving While Undocumented, and Facing the Risks, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2017),
https://nyti.ms/2vwXCVK [https://perma.cc/R6NN-J6FW].
114 Id. See also Julia Preston & Robert Gebeloff, Some Unlicensed Drivers Risk More Than a Fine, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 9, 2010), https://nyti.ms/2ngCenA [https://perma.cc/HT2U-LUXR] (“The crash led Ms. Valencia, an illegal
immigrant who did not have a valid driver’s license, to 12 days in detention and the start of deportation proceedings – after
17 years of living in Georgia.”).
115 Robbins, supra note 113.
116 Id.
117 Preston & Gebeloff, supra note 114.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 See, e.g., Robbins, supra note 113. Robbins cites a California report finding that the number of hit-and-
run accidents decreased by 4,000 in the year after the state began issuing drivers’ licenses for undocumented residents,
despite the presence of 600,000 newly licensed undocumented drivers on the road. A nonpartisan think tank report also
found that implementing such a law in New York state could bring in $57 million in taxes and fees, Robbins notes.
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democracy, however, state constitutions do offer tools to aid in the fight.
State constitutions often specify three methods of amendment: ballot measures,
amendments introduced by the legislature and ratified by the voters, and constitutional
conventions.121 Given that the constitutional convention is an increasingly rare, if not extinct,
method of amending state constitutions,122 lobbying the legislature for constitutional amendments
or engaging in ballot measure campaigns holds more promise. Ballot measures are proposals, placed
on the ballot for a yes or no vote, to enact or repeal laws or constitutional amendments.123
Historically, they have been “the catalyst of many significant public policy changes including
women’s suffrage, labor laws, and gay marriage.”124 “[B]allot measure[s] can be . . . separated into
two categories: referendums and initiatives.”125 Referendums ask voters to accept or reject a state
constitutional amendment or, in some states, a piece of legislation – in both cases, the legislature
controls what goes on the ballot.126 Initiatives originate with the public and can either be placed
directly on the ballot (a “direct initiative”)127 or placed on the ballot after approval by the relevant
legislature (an “indirect initiative”).128
In light of a divided federal Congress and the conservative composition of the executive
and judicial branches, some left-leaning political organizations now see state ballot measures as
more important than ever in the fight for progressive policy change.129 The success of many
progressive ballot measures in the 2018 midterm elections, even in some conservative states and
cities, provide support for this position.130 Of most interest for crimmigration-reform advocates,
voters approved progressive criminal justice ballot measures in Florida, Louisiana, Colorado,
Washington, and Michigan (which became the first Midwestern state to legalize recreational
marijuana),131 and Oregonians rejected an effort to repeal an existing “sanctuary” law.132 Though
this is encouraging news, activists should also note the recent history of ballot measures related to
121 See Stark, supra note 71, at 1076.
122 See John J. Dinan, The Political Dynamics of Mandatory State Constitutional Convention Referendums:
Lessons from the 2000s Regarding Obstacles and Pathways to Their Passage, 71 MONT. L. REV. 395, 396 (2010) (“For
many years, constitutional conventions were called regularly; however, in recent years they have become increasingly
rare. . . . the 40-year period from 1971 to 2010 has produced only 13 conventions (and none after 1992).”).
123 Tanya M. Larrabee, Vote “No” on Criminal Justice Ballot Measures, 42 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 207, 209 (2016).
124 Id. at 208.
125 Id. at 209.
126 Id. at 210.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 See, e.g., Press Release, Justine Sarver, Executive Director, The Ballot Initiative Strategy Center, Ballot
Measures Will Play a Key Role in the Progressive Resistance (Jan. 19, 2017), http://ballot.org/press-release/ballot-measures-
will-play-key-role-progressive-resistance/ [https://perma.cc/3TMY-2EFE].
130 Sarah Holder, Kriston Capps, Laura Bliss, Brentin Mock, Nicole Javorsky & Nicole Flatow, On Ballot
Measures, A Progressive Sweep, CITYLAB (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/life/2018/11/ballot-measures-
progressive-sweep/574942/ [https://perma.cc/653X-WLH6].
131 See Udi Ofer, The 2018 Midterm Elections Were a Big Win for Criminal Justice Reform Ballot Initiatives,
ACLU (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/blog/smart-justice/2018-midterm-elections-were-big-win-criminal-justice-
reform-ballot-initiatives [https://perma.cc/W8VH-AKE3].
132 See Holder et al., On Ballot Measures, A Progressive Sweep, supra note 130.
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criminal justice and immigration. Immigration-related ballot measures are few and far between and
tend to be rights-restrictive, while law enforcement-related ballot measures are far more common
and cover many different topics – but the most consistent theme in the past decade has been laws
or constitutional amendments to increase victims’ rights.133 The types of ballot measures that gain
public support may not align with those sought by advocates of crimmigration reform.
IV. OBSTACLES IN THE PATH OF REFORM
There are at least four types of challenges hindering the use of state constitutionalism for
progressive crimmigration change. First, public opinion about immigration, crime, and who
“deserves” to live or remain in the United States is one hurdle. Few people outside of particular
legal and policy circles are motivated to understand the ins-and-outs of federal immigration law and
how it interacts with crime and drug laws to affect noncitizens in ways that are, at times, wildly
disproportionate and punitive.134 Reports of children ripped from their mothers’ arms by the Trump
Administration’s 2018 family separation policy rightly produced immediate public backlash and
outcry,135 but the American public appears less sympathetic to migrants in other circumstances,
particularly those with criminal records.136
Second, just as those on the left can use state constitutionalism and lawmaking as a vehicle
for reform, so, too, can those on the right. One systematic investigation of restrictionist immigration-
related laws passed at the state and local level found partisanship was a highly salient factor:
“Restrictive state and local immigration laws [were] largely the product of interested policy
advocates who promote[d] such laws in politically receptive jurisdictions, regardless of the
demographic concerns facing that jurisdiction.”137 Another empirical study found that, between
2005 and 2009, states and localities enacted 118 laws relating to the use of criminal law enforcement
tools to target immigration, but only thirty had a positive impact on migrants.138 With Republicans
133 According to Ballotpedia, in the 2010 to 2020 election cycles there were seven immigration-related ballot
measures across five states. Of the seven, only two were rights-expansive. Of the five ballot measures in the 2010-2018
election cycles, three of them passed, including just one progressive measure for in-state college tuition for undocumented
residents. See Immigration on the Ballot, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Immigration_on_the_ballot#By_year
[https://perma.cc/BG4K-FHA3] (last visited April 22, 2020). By contrast, in the 2010 to 2020 election cycles there were
fifty-six law enforcement-related ballot measures across twenty-six states. The topics were wide-ranging, but the most
numerous appeared to be state constitution amendment proposals to increase the rights of victims of crime. See Law
Enforcement on the Ballot, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Law_enforcement_on_the_ballot#By_year
[https://perma.cc/VW9Q-WHSE] (last visited April 22, 2020).
134 See generally Cunnings, supra note 102, and Robbins, supra note 113, for illustrative examples of laws
working together to produce disproportionately punitive outcomes for noncitizens.
135 See, e.g., Editorial Board, The Trump Administration’s Season of Covert Cruelty Toward Children,
WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 19, 2019), https://wapo.st/2FIWuXo?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.16ca34480867 [https://perma.cc/
LV9N-8WPD].
136 See Frances Bernat, Immigration and Crime, OXFORD RES. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, (Aug. 28, 2019), https://oxfordre.com/criminology/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190264079.001.0001/
acrefore-9780190264079-e-93 [https://perma.cc/BU8C-GYL7] (reviewing public opinion literature on Americans’
perceptions about immigrants and crime, and noting that “[d]espite recent research that shows the lack of a direct connection
between immigration and increases in crime, the American public still believes that immigrants are dangerous.”).
137 Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, supra note 27, at 2080–81.
138 GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 21, at 180 (citing Huyen Pham & Pham Hoang Van, Measuring the
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in control of fifty-nine percent of state legislatures139 and fifty-two percent of governor seats,140 the
trends for lawmaking in many states do not appear especially favorable for progressive activists.
Second, state court judges may not be willing to accept arguments for independent, rights-
expansive interpretations of state constitutional provisions. With parallel provisions in particular,
whose wording is exactly mirrored in the U.S. Constitution, state court judges frequently err on the
side of a lockstep approach, meaning state constitutional analysis “begins and ends with
consideration of the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the textual provision at issue.”141 Of
greater concern, judges who face electoral accountability – as is the case in thirty-eight states –
appear less willing than their life-tenured counterparts to recognize new rights.142 State supreme
court justices have, on more than several occasions, lost their seats because of rulings viewed as
progressive.143 By way of example, in 2010, none of the seven states that had recognized some form
of marriage equality used contested judicial elections.144
Lastly, there are a variety of challenges related to effectively using ballot measures for
reform. The most significant concern involves the so-called “tyranny of the majority” and
subordination of “minority” populations.145 Examples abound: Proposition 8 in California,
overturning the California Supreme Court’s ruling that created a right to marriage equality146 and
anti-immigrant ballot measures in Arizona’s 2006 election cycle, all of which passed,147 are notable,
among others.148 Another major issue surrounding ballot measures is that public education can be
enormously expensive, and many ballot measure campaigns receive financial support from a
handful of public and private interest groups that can shape the narratives surrounding the measures’
consequences.149 Often, this politicized arrangement results in sound-bite messaging that flattens
Climate for Immigrants: A State-By-State Analysis, in STRANGENEIGHBORS: THEROLE OFSTATES IN IMMIGRATION POLICY
21, 30 tbl. 1.1 (Carissa Byrne Hessick & Gabriel J. Chin eds. 2014)).
139 State Partisan Composition, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 20, 2020),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/partisan-composition.aspx [https://perma.cc/H5VR-LQ4D].
140 Partisan Composition of Governors, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Partisan_composition_of_
governors [https://perma.cc/BWH8-TG5F] (last visited April 22, 2020).
141 Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and The New Judicial Federalism, 28 Hastings
Const. L. Q. 93, 102 (2000).
142 See Chemerinsky, supra note 90, at 1699.
143 See id; see also, e.g., Lee Rood, Justices Ousted over Gay Marriage Ruling Worry about Politics, DES
MOINES REGISTER (Oct. 29, 2016), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2016/10/29/justices-ousted-over-gay-
marriage-ruling-worry-politics-affecting-bench/92786554/ [https://perma.cc/XC95-ZJDD] (interviewing the three Iowa
Supreme Court justices who were ousted from the bench on a retention election, after ruling in 2009 that a state law limiting
marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the state constitution’s equal protection clause).
144 Chemerinsky, supra note 90, at 1699.
145 See id. at 1702; Larrabee, supra note 123, at 224.
146 See Chemerinsky, supra note 90, at 1701.
147 See Larrabee, supra note 123, at 224.
148 See, e.g., Daniel R. Gordon, The State Constitutionalism of Social Exclusion and Subordination: Stepping
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any complexities, and may confuse rather than educate voters.150 One scholar argues that criminal
justice measures should not go through the initiative process because the stakes are too high, the
rights of a minority group are at risk, and the legal issues at play are extremely complex.151
On the more practical side, voters who are motivated enough to submit a petition as part
of the initiative process may find drafting legislation or constitutional provisions exceedingly
difficult and complicated.152 This can mean that only professional drafters – usually lawyers – have
practical access to the metaphorical levers of the initiative process.153 Lastly, ballot measures that
do successfully pass are frequent targets of legal challenges.154 Citizen-initiated laws are also often
stymied by tactics of unhappy legislators who respond with “counter-proposals, post-enactment
amendments, delays in funding, delays in implementation, and in some cases, outright repeal.”155
Advocates must carefully consider how these challenges stack up against the potential advantages
of using state constitutionalism as a vehicle to pursue progressive crimmigration reform.
V. CONCLUSION
With President Trump in the White House, a divided Congress, and a U.S. Supreme Court
that all but ensures a consistently conservative majority, activists on the left must look elsewhere if
they are to see any forward motion. Witnessing a similar shift in the mid-1970s, Justice Brennan
sought to turn liberal litigators’ attentions to their state courts and state constitutions. A generation
of lawyers heeded that call, setting into motion the New Judicial Federalism to vindicate individual
and civil rights by appealing to the unique texts and histories of their state constitutions.
Crimmigration, a phenomenon and an area of law that was nascent as the New Judicial Federalism
began gaining traction, has yet to be seriously considered as a matter that might benefit from state
constitutionalism. Pursuing state measures is certainly not a hopeless path for crimmigration
activists to tread, but there are significant challenges that may thwart meaningful, widespread
progress. As with any fight for social justice issue, advocates seeking progressive crimmigration
changes should look for as many avenues for change as possible – keeping the arrow of state
constitutionalism in the quiver.
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